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Rethinking Tax Benefits
for Home Owners
Andrew Hanson, Ike Brannon,
and Zackary Hawley

T

he i n di v idua l i ncome- ta x code offers a multitude of beneﬁts for home owners. The largest in dollar terms, and the most
apparent to taxpayers, is the mortgage-interest deduction, which allows
home owners to deduct the interest paid on up to a $1 million mortgage
and up to $100,000 in additional debt backed by home equity. But the tax
code also tilts the balance toward home owners by allowing a deduction
for state and local property taxes and exempting from taxes the capital
gains from the sale of a home. These preferences for home ownership
fall under the umbrella of “tax expenditures,” or provisions that create
special beneﬁts by lowering tax liabilities. Tax expenditures technically
reduce the amount of taxes paid, but they resemble direct spending programs more than they do typical tax laws. The tax beneﬁts for home
ownership are thus essentially subsidies.
Although tax expenditures for housing are not real line items in a
budget the way other spending programs are, they have real effects on
the economy by creating incentives, lowering receipts, raising the debt,
and causing tax rates to be higher than they otherwise would be. The
cost of the tax beneﬁts for owner-occupied housing adds up to about $175
billion annually, with the mortgage-interest deduction alone costing the
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Treasury roughly $100 billion. The ﬁve-year costs of these tax beneﬁts
total well over $1 trillion. To put this amount in perspective, one year
of tax beneﬁts for owner-occupied housing costs more than the discretionary budgets of the departments of Education, Homeland Security,
Energy, and Agriculture combined.
Proponents of these generous tax beneﬁts often justify them by arguing that they encourage home ownership, which in turn is said to offer
society all manner of social and civic beneﬁts. In reality, however, it is
far from clear whether mass home ownership is inherently beneﬁcial to
our society or even to individual home owners. But whatever the merits
of owning a home, the data regarding the reach and distribution of the
various tax beneﬁts we offer owners show that these beneﬁts do not in
fact encourage such ownership in any meaningful way. Most Americans
receive no beneﬁt from the preferential tax treatment of home ownership, and those who do see such beneﬁts tend to be high-income earners
who own large, expensive homes, and who are therefore unlikely to be
on the fence about whether to buy or rent.
In fact, the tax beneﬁts afforded to home owners are highly regressive,
extremely expensive, and of little obvious value to society at large. Even if
we do want to encourage home ownership through the tax code — and it
is by no means obvious that we should — there are far better ways to do
so. By considering the ﬂaws in the tax treatment of housing and examining how our housing-related tax beneﬁts are distributed across incomes
and across the country, we may come to see how these policies might be
transformed to better serve owners, renters, and taxpayers.
w ho benefi ts?
The value of the tax beneﬁts for home ownership depends on housing costs
and income, since the breaks are larger for larger mortgages and amount to
more savings for people in higher tax brackets. This leads to, among other
things, wide variations in beneﬁts among states and metropolitan areas, as
incomes and home prices differ substantially across the country. Incomes
and home prices tend to be higher in the suburbs of major cities and along
the East and West Coasts, while the downtown neighborhoods and innerring suburbs of most cities as well as the more rural regions of the country
tend to have incomes and home prices that are lower.
A look at the distribution of the largest tax break for housing, the
mortgage-interest deduction, reveals a stark difference between the
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beneﬁt that accrues to those earning more than $100,000 a year and those
earning less. The difference between taxpayers on either side of that divide is generally consistent across metropolitan areas of the country. In
most cities, tax ﬁlers with an income above $100,000 are between three
and four times more likely to take advantage of the mortgage-interest
deduction than are taxpayers below that income level.
At ﬁrst glance, these data appear to be consistent with the story that
the mortgage-interest deduction beneﬁts a vast majority of taxpayers: After
all, more than 80% of taxpayers earning over $100,000 in Atlanta, Denver,
Detroit, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Seattle, and Washington,
D.C., claim the deduction. But it is important to recognize that only about
10% of taxpayers have adjusted gross incomes in excess of $100,000. Of
those earning below that level, only 25% take advantage of the mortgageinterest deduction.
sh a r e of fil e r s be ne fi t i ng from t he
mort g age - i n t e r e s t de duc t ion acro s s l a rge m et ro a r e a s ,
by a dj us t e d gro s s i nc om e
Seattle
<$100K: 25.64%
>$100K: 84.76%
Minneapolis-St. Paul
<$100K: 31.49%
>$100K: 84.87%

San Francisco
<$100K: 20.40%
>$100K: 72.40%

Los Angeles
<$100K: 19.02%
>$100K: 74.97%

Detroit
<$100K: 26.34%
>$100K: 80.40%

Chicago
<$100K: 24.71%
>$100K: 78.40%

Denver
<$100K: 29.32%
>$100K: 82.73%

Boston
<$100K: 21.49%
>$100K: 77.47%

New York City
Philadelphia <$100K: 16.80%
<$100K: 23.25% >$100K: 70.72%
>$100K: 80.35%
Washington, D.C.
<$100K: 27.65%
>$100K: 82.83%

Phoenix
<$100K: 28.38%
>$100K: 81.92%
Dallas
<$100K: 18.00%
>$100K: 73.60%

Atlanta
<$100K: 28.62%
>$100K: 84.76%

Houston
<$100K: 15.84%
>$100K: 67.69%
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Among major metropolitan areas, Minneapolis has by far the most
taxpayers who earn less than $100,000 but take the deduction, at 31.5%. But
even there the gap between taxpayers under and over $100,000 in adjusted
gross income is large, as nearly 85% of those earning more than $100,000
beneﬁt from the deduction. Houston has the smallest percentage of taxpayers under $100,000 who beneﬁt from the deduction, with just under
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Hanson, Brannon, and Hawley · Rethinking Tax Beneﬁts for Home Owners

16% receiving any tax savings, while more than four times that proportion
of Houston taxpayers earning more than $100,000 beneﬁt from the deduction. Even in areas with relatively more taxpayers claiming the deduction,
the percentage of those earning less than $100,000 who beneﬁt from it
hovers between 20% and 30%, while the share of tax ﬁlers with incomes
above that level who beneﬁt is between three and four times larger.
Considering that national opinion polls show support for the mortgageinterest deduction ranging between 60% and 90% of the populace,
there seem to be many Americans who believe they beneﬁt from the
deduction when they actually do not. This is surely to some extent a
function of the popular view that the mortgage-interest deduction increases home values, but in fact, as we shall see, the deduction inﬂates
those values across the board, which should appeal only to people who
want to sell their current homes but not buy new ones. Any move away
from the deduction would certainly have to involve a gradual and careful transition to avoid deﬂating that effect too quickly, but home-price
inﬂation hardly justiﬁes the deduction.
The strong public support for the mortgage-interest deduction may
also be due in part to the fact that taxpayers think the amount of savings that they receive through the deduction is large compared to the
savings that others receive, and that their resulting tax savings are proportionally higher. But most people are surely wrong to think so.
A look at the data shows that there are vast differences among
Americans in the amount of tax savings received from the mortgageinterest deduction, but it is a small minority that sees most of the savings.
The average tax savings for the 10% of households earning over $100,000 is
more than double the savings enjoyed by the 90% of households with incomes below that level. In San Francisco, residents earning over $100,000
save $8,000 a year from the deduction, compared to an average savings of
about $3,700 for residents in that area earning under $100,000.
It is also clear that the tax savings from the deduction in places like
San Francisco dwarf the savings in other parts of the country, even for
those earning over $100,000. For example, the high-income group in
Detroit saves just over $4,000 in tax payments as a result of the deduction, just about half the amount saved by high-income home owners
in San Francisco. Those earning less than $100,000 in Detroit average a
savings of less than half that of the high-income residents there, or about
$1,600 annually.
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ta x sav i ngs from t he mort gage -i n t er est de du ct ion
acro s s l a rge m et ro a r e a s ,
by a dj us t e d gro s s i nc om e
Seattle
<$100K: $2,541
>$100K: $5,716
Minneapolis-St. Paul
<$100K: $1,946
>$100K: $4,528

San Francisco
<$100K: $3,667
>$100K: $8,039

Los Angeles
<$100K: $3,210
>$100K: $7,548

Chicago
<$100K: $1,918
>$100K: $4,819

Denver
<$100K: $2,199
>$100K: $5,183

Boston
<$100K: $2,101
>$100K: $5,068

Detroit
<$100K: $1,582
>$100K: $4,053
Philadelphia
<$100K: $1,616
>$100K: $4,316

New York City
<$100K: $2,160
>$100K: $5,346

Washington, D.C.
<$100K: $2,815
>$100K: $6,101

Phoenix
<$100K: $2,417
>$100K: $5,849
Dallas
<$100K: $1,474
>$100K: $4,004

Atlanta
<$100K: $1,794
>$100K: $4,894

Houston
<$100K: $1,428
>$100K: $3,538
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Indeed, the distribution of tax savings from the mortgage-interest
deduction makes it clear that people living in certain parts of California
enjoy a far greater beneﬁt (regardless of income level) than does the rest
of the country. This difference is a function of the high home prices in
that state, but even the beneﬁts in high-home-price environments are
concentrated among the top 10% of taxpayers.
The average benefit for lower-earning households in places
like Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Minneapolis, and
Philadelphia doesn’t even reach $2,000 per year, while in many other
cities the beneﬁt is just slightly more than $2,000 for this income group.
Comparing both income groups and metropolitan areas shows clear evidence of the skewed beneﬁts of the deduction and makes it clear that it
is a narrow segment of higher-income households living in high-priced
areas that beneﬁt most from the policy.
The dramatic variation in beneﬁts across incomes and metropolitan areas is further exacerbated by intra-metropolitan differences in
beneﬁts. The structure of most American metropolitan areas — with
relatively wealthy exurban areas surrounding less well-to-do innerring suburbs and poorer inner-city areas — yields another dimension
on which the beneﬁts from the mortgage-interest deduction differ
quite dramatically.
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The difference between urban and suburban areas is the largest in
Detroit, where twice the proportion of suburbanites claim the deduction
as compared to central-city residents. In cities such as Boston, Dallas,
Denver, Minneapolis, Phoenix, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.,
suburban residents are 50% more likely to deduct mortgage interest than
central-city residents, and the ratio is slightly higher in Atlanta, Chicago,
Houston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.
ta x sav i ngs from mort gage -i n t er est de du ct ion
i n cen t r a l ci t ies a nd su bu r b s
acros s l a rge m et ro a r e a s
CE N T R A L CI T I E S

SU BU R B S

% with
MID beneﬁt

Average Tax
Savings for
MID ﬁlers

% with
MID beneﬁt

Average Tax
Savings for
MID ﬁlers

Atlanta

24.05%

$2,189

39.20%

$2,221

Boston

23.84%

$2,639

36.51%

$2,669

Chicago

21.27%

$2,362

36.70%

$2,363

Dallas

19.20%

$1,627

30.08%

$1,941

Denver

29.41%

$2,317

46.66%

$3,012

Detroit

17.97%

$1,200

37.04%

$2,054

Houston

14.28%

$1,745

25.72%

$1,719

Los Angeles

17.04%

$3,261

30.06%

$3,978

Minneapolis-St. Paul

32.01%

$2,085

45.18%

$2,521

New York

15.06%

$2,460

31.38%

$2,790

Philadelphia

22.49%

$1,491

37.25%

$2,302

Phoenix

28.16%

$2,427

42.08%

$3,229

San Francisco

24.15%

$4,195

37.65%

$4,894

Seattle

30.42%

$3,048

38.25%

$3,122

Washington, D.C.

30.92%

$3,191

44.72%

$3,707

Source: Authors’ calculations.

Still, while suburban taxpayers are more likely to claim the deduction
than those living in the center of the city, the average tax savings for the taxpayers who do claim the deduction are roughly the same: The differences
in tax savings between suburbanites and central-city residents as a result of
the deduction are within $100 for Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston, and
Seattle, and the largest differences — in Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia,
Phoenix, and San Francisco — are no more than $900.
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benefi ts upon benefi ts
The mortgage-interest deduction is the most visible and widely discussed tax break for housing, but it is by no means the only one. Uncle
Sam also allows home owners to deduct the amount they pay in state
and local property taxes, and most capital gains from a sale of a home is
excluded from taxable income. The capital-gains allowance is generous:
Most taxpayers are not responsible for income-tax payments upon realizing even a $250,000 gain from the sale of their home.
Of course, the value of the capital-gains allowance is highly dependent on selling a home in a hot housing market. People in areas that
experience house-price appreciation greatly beneﬁt from this tax break,
while those in areas with slow or negative price growth barely notice its
existence. The beneﬁt from the property-tax deduction similarly varies by
geography. Not only is the property-tax deduction tied to housing values,
but it is also tied to the quality of local public services that are funded
through the property tax — especially schools. Areas that spend a lot on
schools typically raise that money through the property tax, and residents
of those areas are afforded a larger deduction because of it.
a n n ua l cost of housi ng sav i ngs from ta x e x pe n di t u r e s
acro s s l a rge m et ro a r e a s
Seattle
$6,342

Minneapolis-St. Paul
$2,279

San Francisco
$12,274

Los Angeles
$10,651

Chicago
$4,134

Denver
$2,744

Phoenix
$2,637

Boston
$6,356

Detroit
$1,598
Philadelphia
$5,519

New York City
$10,446

Washington, D.C.
$9,216

Dallas
$2,906

Atlanta
$1,628

Houston
$3,371
Source: Authors’ calculations.

The map above shows how these tax expenditures (including the
mortgage-interest deduction) change the annual cost of ownership
for taxpayers in different parts of the country. The calculation of cost
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savings from tax expenditures takes into account differences in incometax rates, debt-to-value ratios, property taxes, and local home-price
inﬂation, but not differences in interest rates or other costs, such as
maintenance and depreciation.
These total cost savings from the preferred tax treatment of housing
across metropolitan areas show even larger differences between areas
than those revealed by looking at the mortgage-interest deduction alone.
The total savings in housing costs from the tax code range from over
$12,000 annually in San Francisco to under $1,600 in Detroit. The average annual beneﬁt of housing-related tax expenditures exceeds $10,000
in both New York and Los Angeles, while it is under $3,000 in Atlanta,
Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, and Phoenix. The Washington, D.C., area
also has a relatively high beneﬁt at over $9,000 per year, whereas places
like Chicago and Houston have comparatively lower beneﬁts, at $4,134
and $3,371 per year, respectively.
Housing tax expenditures are clearly more valuable in places where
house prices have maintained strong appreciation like San Francisco
and in places with high local property taxes like New York. Places
with low property taxes like Houston or negative price appreciation (as
Detroit has had until recently) receive very little annual beneﬁt from the
package of housing tax expenditures.
w h at t he ben efi t bu ys
The skewed distribution of beneﬁts from the mortgage-interest deduction and the larger package of housing-related tax beneﬁts demonstrates
that just a handful of areas, and a handful of taxpayers within those
areas, receive most of the beneﬁt from these generous provisions. This
raises the question of just what society actually gets for $175 billion per
year. The answer, it seems, is that we do not get very much.
To begin with, empirical studies have made it reasonably clear that
these large tax expenditures do not appreciably increase the homeownership rate. Economists have examined the data in two different
ways — by considering how the generosity of the policies has changed
over time and how it varies with geography. Both methods point to the
same conclusion: The generosity of the mortgage-interest deduction is
not correlated with home-ownership rates.
But if housing-related tax beneﬁts, and especially the deduction for
mortgage interest, are not increasing American home-ownership rates,
47
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then what function do they serve in housing markets? Evidence shows
that, rather than encouraging the purchase of homes by people who
might otherwise only rent, the mortgage-interest deduction instead encourages the purchase of larger homes by people who would otherwise
own smaller ones. Estimates show that the generosity of this deduction
alone increases the average size of homes by between 11% and 18%. This
is certainly evident in the size of homes Americans purchase, as the average home purchased today is more than 2,500 square feet — more than
400 square feet larger than the average in 1990 and more than 750 square
feet larger than the average in 1980.
Of course, it is not just the mortgage-interest deduction but the combination of all housing tax preferences that makes a larger home more
appealing to buyers. The data on the map below combine the cost savings from all tax expenditures to show how much larger homes are in
different parts of the country because of these tax breaks.
a ddi t io n a l av e r age hom e siz e pu rch a se from
ta x at io n pr e fe r e nc e o n hou si ng
acro s s l a rge m et ro a r e a s
Seattle
688 sq. ft.

Minneapolis-St. Paul
274 sq. ft.
Chicago
540 sq. ft.

San Francisco
643 sq. ft.

Los Angeles
1,082 sq. ft.

Philadelphia
1,028 sq. ft.

Denver
391 sq. ft.

Phoenix
427 sq. ft.

Boston
734 sq. ft.

Detroit
262 sq. ft.

New York City
840 sq. ft.

Washington, D.C.
1,424 sq. ft.

Dallas
544 sq. ft.

Atlanta
304 sq. ft.

Houston
637 sq. ft.

Source: Estimates of increased square footage from Andrew Hanson, “Size of Home, Homeownership, and the Mortgage Interest Deduction,”
Journal of Housing Economics, 21:3, 2012.

The additional square footage purchased because of housing’s taxpreferred status varies among metropolitan areas, just as the cost savings
from these policies do. At the high end of the spectrum, estimates suggest
that homes are substantially larger due to housing tax expenditures — as
much as 1,400 square feet larger in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
48
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area. In other areas, like Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and New York City,
the effect of housing tax expenditures on the size of homes is smaller but
still quite signiﬁcant, encouraging people to buy homes that are at least
800 square feet larger. Even at the bottom of the distribution, tax beneﬁts
still have a real effect, increasing home sizes by more than 250 square
feet in all metropolitan areas. And it is worth noting that these estimates
include only purchases of owner-occupied single-family homes, so they
do not account for purchases of larger condominiums and necessarily
exclude all rental properties.
Beyond pushing home sizes upward, the tax preferences for home
ownership shape home buyers’ behavior in several other ways. Because
the mortgage-interest deduction can be applied to both a primary and
secondary residence, it almost surely encourages those with the necessary
means to purchase vacation homes — hardly a great social good worthy
of taxpayer subsidies. In addition, the fact that the deduction applies to
the portion of a home ﬁnanced with debt (rather than household savings)
encourages more debt ﬁnancing than would otherwise be the case.
The increase in home sizes, encouragement of second-home purchases, and preference for debt ﬁnancing are all examples of how
housing’s tax preferences distort consumer behavior. All of those
changes in behavior lead to enormous amounts of misplaced economic
activity: If these policies did not exist, consumers would likely purchase
smaller homes using less debt. That misplaced economic activity is what
economists call deadweight loss — a measure of all of the things that
people do too much of as a result of an economic distortion like a subsidy created by the tax code. A recent estimate of the deadweight loss
from the mortgage-interest deduction using Internal Revenue Service
data from actual tax claims found that it is responsible for between $17
and $38 billion annually in misplaced economic activity.
So why isn’t an increase in home ownership among the distortions
attributed to the mortgage-interest deduction? The deduction certainly
changes the annual cost of owning a home — making it cheaper through
the savings on an owner’s annual tax bill. But the mortgage-interest deduction does not do a good job of targeting funds to subsidize marginal
home owners, or those who are deciding between renting and owning
a home. Instead, it provides generous tax breaks to those who would
own a home regardless of the tax treatment, even if it might be a slightly
smaller home.
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The mortgage-interest deduction is not well targeted because it
works as a tax deduction, meaning that for every dollar paid in mortgage interest, a taxpayer subtracts one dollar from the income he pays
taxes on. The amount a taxpayer saves from the deduction is a function
of the top marginal tax rate he pays. Since higher earners tend to pay a
higher top rate, the exact same deduction will, in fact, be more valuable
to taxpayers at the top of the income distribution. At the same time,
using the mortgage-interest deduction requires taxpayers to itemize
deductions — meaning they ﬁll out a form listing all of their varied deductions instead of just checking a box to take the standard deduction.
Nearly all middle- and low-income taxpayers take the standard deduction, making the subsidy created by the mortgage-interest deduction
completely useless to them. The current standard deduction of $12,200
for married couples, while making their tax-ﬁling process simple, makes
the mortgage-interest deduction useless for almost anyone truly on the
margin between owning and renting.
For middle-class families, the standard deduction is also usually the
best option, since it constitutes a sizeable fraction of their income and it
would take a lot of spending on tax-deductible goods and services to have
itemized deductions that exceed the optional standard deduction. For
instance, on a $200,000, 30-year mortgage at 4%, interest payments add
up to only $8,000 the ﬁrst year and gradually decline in subsequent years.
If we assume that this family faces a property tax of 1% and gives 2% of
its income to charity — roughly the national averages for each — then
the three biggest deductions in the code for this prototypical household
add up to the standard deduction. In other words, this family would not
reduce its tax bill at all by purchasing a house. And for the 90% of all U.S.
households with incomes below $146,400 (which was the upper threshold
for the 25% tax bracket in 2013), each dollar above the standard deduction
reduces their federal tax bill by a mere 25 cents at most. The system of tax
expenditures thus offers virtually no incentive for middle-class families
to purchase a home.
The difference in average tax savings between income groups can
be attributed to both the higher marginal tax rate, which means each
dollar deducted from one’s taxable income saves more money, and the
fact that upper-income taxpayers have 60% more mortgage interest to
deduct. They have more interest because they can buy more expensive
homes and take on more debt. A doubling of income more than doubles
50
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the expected tax savings from the mortgage-interest deduction, as it
boosts the family into a higher tax bracket and proportionally increases
the amount they can borrow to purchase a home.
A household with an income of $500,000 can afford a $1 million
mortgage, while a family earning near the national median income of
$51,000 would struggle to afford more than 20% of that. But the tax code
awards the $500,000 household that has the larger mortgage a much
larger subsidy. A million-dollar mortgage at 4% for this family results in
a tax savings of nearly $16,000 a year, or more than ten times that of the
family with the national median income buying a house at the median
price (about $221,000).
a lt er nat i v e av en ue s
Commonsense reforms to federal tax breaks for housing have been proposed from both sides of the political aisle. President George W. Bush’s
tax-reform panel as well as President Obama’s National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform both recommended scaling back
housing’s tax-preferred status. For starters, both recommended capping
the size of mortgages that qualify for a subsidy. Bush’s tax-reform panel
recommended a cap based on regional home prices, while Obama’s
commission recommended lowering the existing cap to a national limit
of $500,000. They both also recommended eliminating the deductibility of mortgage interest in favor of a more straightforward tax credit.
Capping the size of mortgages that qualify for the mortgage-interest
deduction would work toward limiting the subsidy for purchasing a larger
home and reduce much of the geographic and economic disparity in the
subsidy. Switching the deduction to a tax credit, where its value would
not be a function of income but instead be a ﬂat rate, would further limit
the subsidy provided to upper-income taxpayers while simultaneously expanding it at the lower end of the income distribution.
To have a greater effect at the ownership margin, policymakers might
also consider making the credit refundable for lower-income taxpayers,
which would allow the credit to be part of taxpayers’ refunds instead
of just reducing their tax liabilities to zero. Other more modest steps
toward using subsidy dollars to encourage ownership could include
eliminating tax breaks on anything but a primary residence, limiting
the amount of housing-capital gains that is exempt from taxation, or
capping the tax rate that applies to deductions.
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Making the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing less generous
would also generate additional revenues that could be used to lower the
debt or reduce tax rates. Estimates show that eliminating the mortgageinterest deduction completely would likely generate between $41 and $73
billion annually, even after considering that taxpayers would adjust their
behavior in response to the change. Replacing the mortgage-interest
deduction with a tax credit, which would work to increase home ownership, would also generate substantial revenues. Even with the reduction
in revenues expected from increased use of the beneﬁt by lower-income
taxpayers, switching to a 15% tax credit, for instance, would yield between $17 and $25 billion annually.
A 15% tax credit in place of the mortgage-interest deduction would be
better targeted to those who are truly on the margin between owning and
renting, but it would still be relatively expensive. Other ideas that have
been generated at the state level would be much less expensive and may
have similar effects on ownership without the unintended consequence
of encouraging the purchase of larger homes. For example, the Wisconsin
Housing and Economic Development Authority offers assistance to ﬁrsttime home buyers up to a certain income limit (varying between about
$65,000 and $105,000, depending on the county and number of family
members) and purchase price. The program substantially defrays the closing costs that come with purchasing a home, which can pose a serious
impediment to buying a home for a young family that has not had the
time to accumulate signiﬁcant savings. WHEDA provides the beneﬁt as a
low-interest loan that it recoups by wrapping it into the mortgage it also
provides, so the program costs the state nearly nothing.
Of course, any change in the tax treatment of housing would result in
some costs for those who already own their homes. These home owners
bought their houses under the assumption that they would receive these
tax beneﬁts and, perhaps even more important, that any future buyer
would also expect these beneﬁts, meaning the owner could effectively
add the value of those beneﬁts to the price of the home. This expectation essentially inﬂates home prices. Changing the tax treatment of home
ownership would reduce or eliminate that inﬂation, but whoever owns a
home when the policy is eliminated would suffer all of that loss — raising
problems of fairness, let alone of politics.
While the problem of a potential house-price decline cannot
be avoided if tax policy is to be changed to better target it toward
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encouraging ownership, the transition can be smoothed in ways that
would help a great deal. The 2005 Tax Reform Panel, for instance, recommended a phased transition from current policy to a tax credit with
regional caps based on median home prices. Lowering the limit on deductibility from $1 million to $750,000 could be undertaken immediately
with almost no effect on the broader housing market. In subsequent
years the cap could be reduced in $100,000 increments until the desired
level was reached. Similarly, capping the deduction at 28% immediately
would have only a small effect on the broader housing market while a
15% credit is phased in.
Considering the dollar amounts involved, and the fact that a home
is easily the single biggest purchase most people ever make, it is worth
questioning whether the government should be in the business of encouraging home ownership at all. Typically, the argument in favor of
using public funds to encourage ownership is based on the idea that
home owners produce some social beneﬁts outside of the beneﬁts they
receive themselves. While this idea makes sense in theory, recent evidence amassed by economists through randomized experiments calls
this conventional wisdom into question. This work shows that many of
the things that are often considered to be positive social beneﬁts of home
ownership, like rates of voting and civic engagement, are not actually
caused by owning a home.
Furthermore, research shows that owning a home that declines in
value makes workers less mobile — a phenomenon known as “housing
lock.” This is especially apparent when home owners have negative equity, or owe more on their mortgage than they could sell their house
for. Certainly the housing bubble and subsequent bust put many recent
home buyers in a negative-equity position, and this bust (for obvious
reasons) hit especially hard in places that had declining labor markets. Encouraging ownership through public policy exacerbates the
problem of housing lock, making it harder for workers to ﬁnd jobs in
other locations by constraining them to a location with a declining
labor market.
A gradual transition away from tax policy that encourages home
ownership would, of course, yield even greater savings to the taxpayer
that could be translated into lower tax rates or other tax beneﬁts, such
as additional relief for families. It might also conﬁne government to a
more appropriate role.
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ta rget i ng benefi ts
For far too long, our system of generous tax beneﬁts for home owners
has escaped careful scrutiny and criticism. Even in tight ﬁscal times,
when policymakers are eager to ﬁnd ways to save money, the mortgageinterest deduction and other housing-related tax beneﬁts have remained
unthreatened and untouched.
But if the goal of these policies is to increase home-ownership rates in
ﬁscally sensible ways, the current package of housing-related tax expenditures certainly fails. These policies unevenly beneﬁt higher-income
residents residing in the suburbs of coastal metropolitan areas — particularly those in California. Instead of encouraging ownership, they
tend to make housing cheaper for a small segment of the population that
uses those savings to buy larger, more expensive homes than they would
otherwise be able to afford.
Reforms that reduce the beneﬁt to upper-income taxpayers and expand
coverage to those at the margin between owning a home and renting
would increase home ownership while at the same time saving taxpayers
a great deal of money. It is time to stop treating these beneﬁts as a third
rail of our ﬁscal politics and to take on some much-needed reforms.
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